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Abstract 
What mental representations give us the sense of our body as a unique object in the world?  We 
investigated this issue in the context of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), an illusion of body image 
in which a prosthetic hand brushed synchronously, but not asynchronously, with one’s own hand 
is perceived as actually being one’s hand.  We conducted a large-scale study of the RHI, and 
used psychometric analysis to reveal the structure of the subjective experience of the experience 
of embodiment (Longo et al., 2008, Cognition, 107, 978-998).  Here, we use this dataset to 
investigate the relation between incorporation of a rubber hand into the body image and the 
perceived similarity between the participant’s hand and the rubber hand.  Objective similarity (as 
measured by skin luminance, hand shape, and third-person similarity ratings) did not appear to 
influence participants’ experience of the RHI.  Conversely, incorporation of the rubber hand into 
the body image did affect the similarity that participants perceived between their own hand and 
the rubber hand.  Participants who had experienced the RHI perceived their hand and the rubber 
hand as significantly more similar than participants who had not experienced the illusion.  That 
is, embodiment lead to perceived similarity, but perceived similarity did not lead to embodiment.  
Furthermore, similarity ratings following the illusion were selectively correlated with some 
components of embodiment, but not with others.  These results suggest an important role of a 
mental body image in the perception of the relation between the self and others. 
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Self Awareness and the Body Image 
 
Several recent theories have suggested that perception and cognition are fundamentally 
shaped by the body (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Gallagher, 2005; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Proffitt, 
2006).  A wide range of cognitive processes either invoke, or are influenced by, representations 
of the body (for review, see Barsalou, 2008).  For example, non-informative vision of the body 
increases the spatial acuity of touch (Kennett, Taylor-Clarke, & Haggard, 2001).  However, it is 
less clear what sorts of body representation underlie such effects.  Psychologists and 
philosophers have classically drawn a major division between two representations of the body: 
the body image and the body schema (e.g., Gallagher, 1986; Paillard, 2005).  The body image 
represents the perceived form of our body, in terms of its size, shape, and distinctive 
characteristics.  The body schema, in contrast, is predominantly somatosensory, and is concerned 
with tracking and updating the positions of body parts in space during movement.  Except in 
unusual situations (e.g., Gallagher & Cole, 1995), both the body image and body schema are 
always present.  This highlights a major problem in testing the role of embodiment in perception: 
the body, as James (1890) wrote, is “always there”.  This makes it difficult to perform 
experimental manipulations involving the body, since the crucial control condition – in which the 
participant does not have a body – is impossible to implement. 
One approach to this problem involves using bodily illusions that incorporate an external 
object into the body.  In the rubber hand illusion (RHI), for example, a prosthetic hand that is 
touched in perfect temporal synchrony with touches of the participant’s unseen hand is perceived 
as actually being part of the participant’s body (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998); identical, but 
temporally asynchronous, stimulation does not produce this sensation.  Thus, the RHI allows 
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manipulation of body representations, by comparing conditions in which the rubber hand and the 
participant’s hand are touch in phase (synchronous stimulation) or out of phase (asynchronous 
stimulation).  On the one hand, the RHI involves linking a visually-appropriate object, the rubber 
hand, to the self, suggesting a body image component (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005).  On the other 
hand, a strong component of the illusion, and indeed one commonly-used way of measuring it, is 
the change in location of the participant’s hand towards the rubber hand (e.g., Holmes et al., 
2006; Longo et al., 2008b; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005).  Since spatial location is a key feature of 
the body schema, but not of the body image, this suggests an involvement of body schema.  The 
RHI offers the possibility to study the relation between these two components of bodily 
experience.  Location biases are selectively related to certain aspects of the conscious experience 
of embodiment, but not to others (Longo et al., 2008b), suggesting that the body imagistic and 
body schematic components of the illusion, while related, are dissociable.  In this study, we 
accordingly used the RHI to investigate the role of body image in the perception of similarity 
between oneself and others. 
The idea that similar things share some level of identity is deeply seeded in the human 
psyche (Frazer, 1922).  Botvinick and Cohen (1998) initially suggested that the similarity 
between the participant’s hand and the rubber hand was important for the occurrence of the RHI.  
Armel and Ramachandran (2003), in contrast, found that the illusion could be elicited by 
brushing a table synchronously with the participant’s hand.  They argued that that the illusion 
resulted as a purely bottom-up result of visuotactile synchrony.  Tsakiris and Haggard (2005), 
however, demonstrated that the disturbances of proprioceptive location occurred only when a 
congruent rubber hand was presented, and not when viewing either a block of wood, or a rubber 
hand with the opposite handedness from that stimulated.  Similar results were found by Holmes, 
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Snijders, and Spence (2006).  This suggests that the body image functions in a top-down manner 
as a filter, allowing only stimuli which are sufficiently similar to be incorporated, and inducing 
adaptations of the body schema as a result (cf. Tsakiris et al., 2008). 
However, none of these studies systematically manipulated the similarity between the 
rubber hand and the participant’s own hand, or even attempted to quantify degree of similarity.  
Thus, the parameters of the filter remain unclear, that is, how severe the constraint of similarity 
must be for a physical object to become incorporated into the body image.  This issue could be 
investigated in two quite different ways.  One could attempt to elicit an RHI with a variety of 
objects, varying along a continuum for very similar to the participant’s own hand, to very 
dissimilar.  Here, we take a more naturalistic approach, relying on the natural morphological 
variation between people’s hands, and investigate whether a specific rubber hand evokes a 
stronger RHI in participants whose hands happen to more closely resemble the rubber hand.  For 
example, participants whose hands are more similar to the rubber hand (e.g., in complexion) 
might experience the RHI more strongly than participants whose hands are less similar to the 
rubber hand.  Alternatively, the filtering effect of the body image may be categorical, allowing 
anything which has the general characteristics of a hand to be incorporated into the body image, 
without regard to within-category similarity.  Evidence in favour of this latter proposal comes 
from a study by Holmes and colleagues (2006), who found that a white rubber hand evoked 
comparable RHIs in white and black participants.  These results suggest that objective similarity 
may play little role in the formation of embodiment. 
We conducted a large-sample, psychometric study of the RHI (Longo et al., 2008b), with 
the aim of dissociating the experience of embodiment evoked in the RHI into distinct 
components.  Following blocks of synchronous and asynchronous brushing, we collected data on 
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27 questionnaire items assessing a wide range of experiences participants might have had.  
Principal components analysis (PCA) on these data revealed four components that emerged in 
both experimental conditions: embodiment
1
, reflecting feelings that the rubber hand belonged to 
the participant, the participant had control over the rubber hand, the rubber hand and real hand 
were in the same location, and the rubber hand had taken on features of the actual hand; loss of 
own hand, reflecting feelings of being unable to move one’s hand, one’s hand disappearing, and 
one’s hand being out of one’s control; movement, relating to perceived motion of one’s own 
hand, and to movement of the rubber hand; and affect, relating to the experience of the block 
being interesting and enjoyable, and the touch of the paintbrush is being pleasant.  An additional 
fifth component, deafference, appeared only in the asynchronous condition, which related to the 
sensation of pins-and-needles and numbness in one’s hand, and the experience of the hand being 
less vivid than normal.  Furthermore, a secondary PCA revealed that the embodiment component 
was itself comprised of three dissociable components: ownership, related to the feeling that the 
rubber hand was part of one’s body, the feeling of looking directly at one’s hand, and the rubber 
hand taking on the characteristics of one’s own hand; location, related to the feeling that the 
rubber hand and one’s own hand were in the same place, and also to sensations of causation 
between the seen and felt touches; and agency, related to the feelings of being able to move the 
rubber hand and control over it. 
In the present study, we used this same data set to investigate the relation between the 
experience of embodiment and the perception of similarity that participants perceive between 
their own hand and the rubber hand.  In addition to the subjective report data described 
previously, participants were asked to rate the similarity they perceived between their own hand 
and the rubber hand.  Moreover, their hand was photographed so that an objective measure of 
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similarity (skin luminance) and third-person similarity ratings could be obtained.  This similarity 
data is here presented and analysed for the first time, in order to investigate three main issues.  
First, we investigated whether objective morphological similarity affects the incorporation of a 
rubber hand into the body image.  Second, we investigated the converse effect, whether the 
incorporation of the rubber hand into the body image has functional consequences for subsequent 
perception of similarity between one’s own hand and the rubber hand.  And third, we 
investigated the relation between these effects and specific components of the experience of 
embodiment that we identified in our previous psychometric study (Longo et al., 2008b). 
Methods 
Participants 
 The studies were approved by the local ethical committee.  In study 1, one hundred and 
thirty one current and prospective students at University College London (75 female) 
participated in the RHI session and made first-person similarity ratings.  The RHI measures from 
this dataset were reported previously (Longo et al., 2008b), but the similarity judgements are 
presented here for the first time.  In study 2, 25 new University College London students (21 
female) made first-person similarity ratings without having experienced the RHI.  In study 3, a 
further group of four new participants (1 female), including one of the authors (MRL), made 
third-person similarity ratings of the rubber hand and each participant’s hand for both the RHI 
and no-RHI groups.  The third-person raters did not know about the performance of individual 
participants in the RHI study, nor about individual participants’ first-person similarity ratings.  
That is, the third-person ratings were blind and independent. 
Rubber Hand Illusion and First-Person Similarity Ratings 
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Participants sat across from the experimenter, and placed their hand into a specially 
constructed box.  Participants wore a cloth smock which was attached to the front edge of the 
box, such that their arms were out of view throughout the experiment.  There were two 
experimental conditions, presented in two successive blocks (order counterbalanced across 
participants).  In the synchronous condition, the hands were stroked at the same time; in the 
asynchronous condition they were stroked 180˚ out of phase.  Each block began with the cover 
lowered and participants placed either the right (N = 67) or left (N = 64) hand into a hole cut into 
the front of the box
2
.  Another hole was cut on top of the box, through which the participant 
could see the rubber hand; and most of the back of the box was removed, so that the 
experimenter was able to brush the hands.  Each box was 36.5 cm wide, 19 cm high, and 29 cm 
deep.  The inside of the box was lined with grey felt, and a small Velcro disk indicated where the 
tip of the participant’s index finger should be placed.  A black cover (59.5 cm by 29 cm) was 
connected to the box by two hinges. When the cover was open, the rubber hand could be seen by 
the participant, but the experimenter was hidden from view; when it was closed, the opposite was 
true.  The cover was raised and a 60-s induction phase began in which both the rubber hand and 
the participant’s hand were brushed with two identical paintbrushes (Winsor & Newton, 
London).  Brush strokes were made at approximately 1 Hz.  The rubber hands were life sized 
prosthetic hands, one of a right hand, the other of a left hand. 
After induction, participants removed their hand from the box and the questionnaire was 
given.  Participants indicated their agreement or disagreement with 27 statements in each block, 
using a 7-item Likert scale. A response of +3 indicated that they ‘‘strongly agreed” with the 
statement, -3 that they ‘‘strongly disagreed”, and 0 that they ‘‘neither agreed nor disagreed”, 
though any intermediate value could be used. Before the questionnaire in the first block, the 
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scale was explained to the participant.  A sheet of paper showing the scale and the 7 possible 
responses was placed on the box in front of the participant throughout the questionnaire. The first 
two items presented were always items (20 and 21) relating to the experience being interesting 
and enjoyable; the order of subsequent items was randomized separately for each participant in 
each condition. 
PCA with orthogonal varimax rotation was used to investigate the structure underlying 
the experience of the RHI (for details, see Longo et al., 2008b).  Separate PCAs were conducted 
for the synchronous and asynchronous conditions.  As described in the introduction, four 
components were extracted in the synchronous condition: embodiment of rubber hand, loss of 
own hand, movement, and affect.  The same four components were observed in the asynchronous 
condition, plus a fifth component, deafference.  Detailed methods for the collection of the 
subjective reports and extraction of components from the PCAs are described in our previous 
paper (Longo et al., 2008b). 
Following the questionnaires, participants were asked to rate the similarity of the rubber 
hand and their own hand, using the same Likert scale used for the RHI questionnaire.  Finally, a 
photograph of each participant’s hand (resting dorsum-up on a sheet of white paper) was taken 
with a digital camera.  One participant preferred not to have her hand photographed, and so was 
not included in analyses involving photographs. 
Third-Person Similarity Ratings 
 The images of participants’ hands were cropped so that the hands took up most of the 
frame.  Raters were instructed to rate how similar each hand was to the corresponding rubber 
hand using the same -3 to +3 scale used for first-person ratings.  No specific instructions were 
given regarding which aspects of hand appearance were relevant, except that ratings should be 
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made on the similarity of the intrinsic characteristics of the hands, not on their posture or 
position.  Images were presented to raters on a computer monitor, displayed by a MATLAB 
script (MathWorks, Natick, MA).  On each trial, the image of the appropriate (i.e., right or left) 
rubber hand was first presented for 2,000 ms, followed by a blank screen for 500 ms, and then 
the image of the to-be-judged hand was displayed until the rater responded.  Responses were 
untimed, and made by pressing one of a set of keys on a keyboard labelled from -3 to +3.  Order 
of images was randomized. 
Skin Complexion 
Skin complexion was quantified by calculating the mean luminance of a large selection 
of the dorsum of the hand using ImageJ software (U.S. National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, 
MD; Abramoff, Magelhaes, & Ram, 2004).  In order to adjust for potential differences in 
luminance between testing sessions, the luminance of a large selection of the white sheet of 
paper was calculated as well, and the ratio of skin to paper luminance was used.  These ratios 
were strongly correlated with uncorrected luminance measured from the hand alone, r(129) = 
.803, p < .0001, and so the Z-transformed ratios were used for subsequent analyses. 
Shape Index 
 To compute a measure of overall hand shape from photographs, we a modified version of 
the shape index developed by Napier (1980).  This index reflects the ratio of hand width to hand 
length.  Napier computed maximum hand width on the palmar surface, and the distance between 
the wrist and tip of the middle finger.  Here, as these values had to be coded from photographs, 
we used the distance between the knuckles of the index and little fingers as our measure of hand 
width as length of the middle finger (from centre of fingertip to knuckle on the hand dorsum) as 
our measure of hand length.  Following Napier, we computed the shape index as 100 times the 
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ratio of width to length.  This produces a shape index which is conceptually similar to Napier’s, 
though the two indices are not directly comparable numerically.  A smaller shape index indicates 
a more slender hand, and a larger value indicates a fatter hand.  The mean shape index for 
participants in study 1 was 61.16 (SD = 4.86, range: 49.85 – 75.64), and in study 2 was 62.22 
(SD = 3.86; range: 51.12 – 69.26).  The shape index for the rubber hands was 69.23, near the 
extreme end in terms of fatness.  Thus, larger shape indices indicate increasing objective 
similarity in shape to the rubber hand. 
Results 
Relations between Measures of Similarity 
 Interestingly, first- and third-person similarity ratings were uncorrelated across all 
participants, r(154) = .045, as well as for the subsets of participants who had experienced the 
RHI (study 1), r(129) = .057, and those who had not (study 2), r(24) = -.047.  Figure 1 shows 
scatterplots of the relations between first-person similarity, third-person similarity, and skin 
complexion for participants in study 1. 
 Multiple linear-regression was used to investigate the relation between hand complexion 
and shape and similarity ratings by including complexion and shape index scores as 
simultaneous regressors of judged similarity.  While there was a significant (though modest) 
correlation between complexion and size index, r(154) = .257, p < .005, including both variables 
as regressors isolates the independent effect of each.  For third-person similarity ratings in study 
3, both complexion, ß = 5.132, t(152) = 9.42, p < .0001, and size index, ß = .044, t(152) = 2.86, p 
< .005, were significant independent predictors.  The lighter a participant’s skin and the fatter 
their hand, the more similar their hand was judged by other people to be similar to the (fat white) 
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rubber hand.  This demonstrates, unsurprisingly, that skin colour and hand shape are salient 
features of perceived similarity. 
 First-person similarity judgments of participants in study 1, who had experienced the 
RHI, were not predicted either by complexion, ß = -.052, t(127) = -.05, nor by size index, ß = -
.001, t(127) = -.05.  However, for participants who had not experienced the RHI (study 2), size 
index was a significant predictor of first-person similarity ratings, ß = .203, t(22) = 2.62, p < .02, 
though complexion remained non-significant, ß = -5.41, t(22) = -1.53, p > .10. 
Effects of Similarity on the Experience of Embodiment 
 To examine how similarity judged by a third-person might relate to the participants’ first-
person experience of the RHI, we ran multiple-linear regressions on third-person similarity 
judgments and on skin complexion with RHI component scores (Longo et al., 2008b) as 
predictor variables.  Separate regressions were conducted on overall effects across conditions 
(i.e., the average of component scores in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions), and on 
the specific effect of multisensory synchrony (i.e., the residuals remaining after regressing scores 
in the synchronous condition on those in the asynchronous condition).  These residuals were 
used in favour of the difference between the conditions as they more effectively isolate the 
variance attributable to the synchronous condition.  Nonetheless, there was a strong correlation 
between the two measures: r = .913, .850, .878, and .905, for the embodiment, loss of own hand, 
movement, and affect components, and r = .814, .864, and .870 for the ownership, location, and 
agency components. 
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
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 Neither skin complexion (see Table 1), shape index (see Table 2), nor third-person 
similarity (see Table 3) were significant positive predictors of embodiment
1
.  Complexion was, 
however, a significant positive predictor of affect across conditions, suggesting that similarity 
may influence the affective dimension of touch (cf. Essick, James, & McGlone, 1999).  A similar 
trend was observed for the relation between third-person similarity judgments and the affect 
component.  There were also two components in the primary PCA (loss of own hand, and 
movement) and one in the secondary PCA (location) which were negatively related to 
complexion and to third-person similarity across conditions.  The location component, 
furthermore, was also negatively predicted by hand shape.  It is not clear why such negative 
relations should occur.  In the case of the loss of own hand component, a similar rubber hand 
may be mistaken for one’s own hand, while a dissimilar rubber hand may displace one’s own 
hand in the body image.  One would experience the loss of one’s own hand only in the latter 
situation.  Nevertheless, these results clearly demonstrate that similarity between a participant’s 
hand and the rubber hand is not a necessary condition for the incorporation of the rubber hand 
into the body image, consistent with the findings of Holmes et al. (2006). 
 
*** INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
 We also investigated the relation between similarity and proprioceptive biases induced by 
the RHI.  There were no significant relations between either complexion, shape index, or third-
person similarity ratings and the average proprioceptive bias across conditions, r(119) = .11, -
.04, .07, p’s > .20, nor the difference in bias between conditions, r(119) = .00, .01, .01, p’s > .20. 
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Effects of Embodiment on the Perception of Similarity 
Participants in study 2, who had not experienced the RHI, showed a trend to perceive 
their hand as dissimilar to the rubber hand, t(24) = -1.74, p = .09 (see Figure 2).  In contrast, 
participants in study 1 who had experienced the illusion reported significant positive similarity, 
t(129) = 4.69, p < .0001.  A between-study comparison showed that first-person experience of 
the RHI lead to a strong increase in the perceived similarity between their hand and the rubber 
hand, t(153) = 3.40, p < .001.  Interestingly, mean ratings of the third-person raters from study 3 
did not differ significantly between these two groups, t(153) = .22 (see Figure 2), suggesting that 
there were no intrinsic differences in the similarity of the two groups to the rubber hand.  These 
results demonstrate that the first-person experience of embodiment significantly increased the 
perceived similarity participants felt between their own hand and the rubber hands. 
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
Does this increased similarity reflect a change in their perception of their own hand, or of 
the rubber hand?  A common finding among numerous studies of the RHI is that participants 
show more agreement with statements relating to the perception of the rubber hand becoming 
more like one’s own hand, rather than the converse (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Longo et al., 
2008b; Peled et al., 2000).  This was true as well in the present data set.  For example, the 
questionnaire item “it seemed like the rubber hand began to resemble my real hand” loaded on 
the embodiment component (Longo et al., 2008b) and participants showed significant agreement 
with it following synchronous stroking, mean Likert score: .53, t(130) = 3.16, p < .005, but not 
following asynchronous stroking, mean Likert score: -.53, t(130) = -2.98, p < .005.  In contrast, 
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the item “it seemed like my own hand became rubbery” did not load on any component at all 
(Longo et al., 2008b), and did not elicit agreement following synchronous stroking, mean Likert 
score: -.50, t(130) = -2.90, p < .005, or asynchronous stroking, mean Likert score: -.847, t(130) = 
-5.27, p < .0001.  Thus, it seems likely that the increased similarity is related to changed 
perceptions of the rubber hand, rather than one’s own hand. To examine this issue, we used 
multiple-linear regression to investigate the relation between participants’ responses to these two 
questionnaire items and the similarity they perceived between their own hand and the rubber 
hand.  Separate regressions were run on responses in the synchronous and asynchronous 
conditions.  The item concerning the rubber hand beginning to resemble one’s own hand was a 
significant predictor of perceived similarity both following synchronous, β = .20, t(128) = 2.55, p 
< .02, and asynchronous stroking, β = .18, t(128) = 2.45, p < .02.  In contrast, the item relating to 
one’s own hand becoming rubbery was not a significant predictor of perceived similarity in 
either condition, β = .10, .05, t(128) = 1.37, .61, p’s > .20, respectively.  This pattern confirms 
that the increase in similarity participants perceived reflects a change in their perception of the 
rubber hand, rather than their own hand. 
The effects of each component of the RHI on perceived similarity were investigated with 
multiple-linear regression.  As above, separate regressions were conducted on overall effects 
across conditions (synchronous + asynchronous), and on the specific effects of multisensory 
synchrony (residuals remaining after regressing synchronous scores on asynchronous scores).  
Results are shown in Table 4.  The embodiment and loss of own hand components in the primary 
PCA, and ownership and agency in the secondary PCA, were significant predictors of perceived 
similarity across conditions.  The specific effect of multisensory synchrony was a significant 
positive predictor of the sense of agency, but not of any other effects. 
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*** INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
 First-person similarity was not significantly correlated with proprioceptive biases, either 
across, r(119) = .08, p > .20, or between, r(119) = -.12, p > .20, conditions. 
 
Discussion 
 Similarity does not appear to affect the rubber hand illusion; the rubber hand illusion, 
however, does affect perceived similarity.  The experience of incorporating a rubber hand into 
the body image altered the perception of the relation between oneself and the rubber hand.  
Participants who had experienced the RHI reported significantly greater similarity between their 
own hand and the rubber hand than participants who had not experienced the RHI.  This 
increase, furthermore, was related to specific aspects of the experience of the illusion, i.e., the 
feelings of ownership and agency over the rubber hand, and the feeling that one’s own hand had 
disappeared (the ownership, agency, and loss of own hand components), but was unrelated to 
other aspects of the experience (i.e., the movement, affect, and location components).  The 
influence of the RHI on perceived similarity was limited to the subjective experience of the 
illusion, and was not related to proprioceptive biases induced by the illusion.  This suggests that 
similarity is related more to body imagistic than body schematic components of the RHI, by what 
the body is, not where the body is.  Thus, not only do the present results show that the body 
image has functional effects on perception, they isolate this effect to specific components of 
body representation.  Conversely, with the possible exception of affective experience, the pre-
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existing similarity between participants’ hands and the rubber hand, as measured by skin 
luminance, shape indices, and third-person ratings, had no major influence on the RHI. 
These results have important implications for our understanding of the body image.  First, 
these results demonstrate that embodiment is not a fleeting experience, but has functional 
consequences for perception.  Even after the initial experiences of multisensory stimulation and 
of embodiment of the rubber hand have gone, measurable effects remain on our representation of 
the relation between our body and the world.  This provides a first clue about how current 
sensory experience may be continuously integrated to produce an enduring, diachronic body 
image and sense of self, and of our relation to others.  Previous results suggested that a level of 
morphological similarity was necessary for embodiment to occur (e.g., Holmes et al., 2006; 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005).  Our result now also shows that the relation is reciprocal; 
embodiment increases perceived similarity.  This dovetails with a recent finding that shared 
multisensory experiences in the form of assimilating someone else’s face alters self-face 
recognition (Tsakiris, 2008).  
Most of these effects of the experience of embodiment on the perception of similarity 
were related to the overall amount of embodiment across synchronous and asynchronous 
stroking conditions, rather than specific to the synchronous condition.  While it is tempting to 
consider the asynchronous stroking condition to be merely a no-illusion control condition, this 
result suggests, in contrast, that it produces a complex experience in its own right, with 
meaningful variation across participants.  This fits with the finding from our initial study (Longo 
et al., 2008b) that structure (specifically the deafference component) appears only in the 
asynchronous condition.  The sense of agency, however, was significantly related to perceived 
similarity both across conditions, but also when variance specific to the synchronous condition 
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was investigated.  This result shows both that there are qualitative, as well as quantitative, 
differences between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions (cf. Longo et al., 2008b), and 
further suggests important functional differences between the sense of agency and other 
components of embodiment, such as the experience of ownership (cf. Longo & Haggard, 2009; 
Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006). 
How might the experience of embodiment affect perceived similarity?  Several studies 
have demonstrated that categorization and top-down effects of visual imagery modulate visual 
perception.  In addition to the well-known categorical perception effects in colour perception 
(e.g., Kay & Kempton, 1984), studies have shown that categorizing an object leads to perceptual 
changes such that the object takes on properties characteristic of the category (Goldstone, 1995; 
Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, & Gegenfurter, 2006).  Hansen and colleagues (2006), for example, 
found that the point at which participants judged a picture of a banana (which is prototypically 
yellow) to be achromatic was slightly blue (the opponent colour of a prototypical banana).  An 
analogous effect could occur in the context of the RHI, such that the illusion of embodiment over 
the rubber hand could lead to genuine changes in the perception of the rubber hand, such that it 
would adopt features known to characterize the participant’s own hand.  We suggest that this 
may occur specifically for the perceived shape of the rubber hand, given that shape – but not 
colour – appeared to underlie first-person similarity judgments for participants who had not 
experienced the RHI.  This interpretation can account for the finding that participants who had 
experienced the RHI did not appear to base their similarity judgments on the actual shape of the 
rubber hand, since these participants would have been misperceiving the actual shape. 
In contrast to the effects of embodiment on similarity, similarity in terms of skin 
complexion, overall shape, or as rated by other participants was generally unrelated to the first-
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person experience of embodiment.  That a rubber hand has the shape of a hand appears to be a 
necessary condition for eliciting the experience of embodiment (Holmes et al., 2006; Tsakiris & 
Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2008).  Given that it is shaped like a hand, however, it need not be 
at all similar in its specific characteristics to the participant’s hand.  This suggests that the body 
image filter applied is a person-independent, generic body image, representing hands generally, 
rather than a self-specific body image, representing my hand specifically (cf. Longo, Cardozo, & 
Haggard, 2008a).  The representation of bodies generally may be crucial for the creation of the 
image of what my body, specifically, is like (cf. the ‘looking glass self’, Cooley, 1902).  This is 
consistent with the proposal of Brugger and colleagues (2000) that experience of phantom limbs 
in congenital limb absence may result from the constant perception of others with intact limbs. 
Our results, furthermore, shed light on the direction of change in embodiment. 
Interactions between the body and the external world can occur in two directions: outwards from 
the body to the world (egofugal), or inwards from the world to the body (egopetal).  Previous 
studies of multi-sensory embodiment have focussed on the egofugal extension of the body into 
the outside world, as in studies of tool-use (e.g., Iriki, Tanaka, & Iwamura, 1996).  While these 
positions are often difficult to distinguish experimentally, the present data suggests that the RHI 
may reflect an egopetal, rather than an egofugal, process.  Specifically, participants’ similarity 
ratings were correlated with the subjective experience that the rubber hand was becoming more 
like their own hand, but not with the converse.  This finding is consistent with several pieces of 
evidence from our previous study (Longo et al., 2008b).  First, following synchronous stroking, 
participants report the subjective experience that the rubber hand was becoming like their own 
hand, but not vice versa.  Second, only the item reflecting perceived changes in the rubber hand 
loaded on a component (ownership) in our PCA, suggesting that the other item reflecting 
Self Awareness and the Body Image 
 20 
perceived changes in the participant’s own hand was not an important aspect of any of the 
components of the experience of the illusion.  Third, the loss of own hand component was 
significantly stronger following synchronous than asynchronous stroking, suggesting that the 
rubber hand had, at least in part, displaced the participant’s own hand.  Thus, the first-person 
experience of embodiment appears to lead to incorporation of external objects by assimilating 
them into a pre-existing body image, rather than by extending the self outwards to include the 
external object, as if it were a supernumerary limb (cf. McGonigle et al., 2002).   
Lastly, these results have potential implications for the role of the body image in 
interpersonal relations.  The lack of relation between first- and third-person similarity judgments 
is striking, as is the fact that first-person similarity judgments were completely independent of 
skin complexion.  Furthermore, while participants in study 2 who had not experienced the RHI 
used hand shape as a cue to similarity, there was no evidence for this in participants in study 1 
who had experienced the illusion.  These findings suggest that the first-person experience of 
embodiment may alter our perception of the relation between our body and the external world.   
Mitchell, Banaji, and Macrae (2005) had participants rate the similarity of their own face 
with photographs of a number of other faces.  Their participants did not rate same-sex faces as 
any more similar to their own face than other-sex faces.  That complexion was not used in our 
first-person similarity judgments, however, is more striking, given that other studies have found 
that sex and age did not affect third-person similarity judgments (e.g., Maloney & Dal Martello, 
2006).  Such effects have been interpreted as evidence that third-person similarity ratings are 
implicit proxies for perceived genetic relatedness, which is of course independent of sex and age.  
Complexion, however, is a cue to genetic relatedness, suggesting a qualitative difference 
between first- and third-person judgments.  It is important to note, however, that interpreting 
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such differences is not unproblematic, given that first-person judgments were only made of 
oneself, whereas third-person judgments were made of a large set of individuals.  This raises the 
possibility of a range restriction problem for first-person judgments, which could have been less 
precise as a result.  Mitigating this concern, however, is the fact that we find an apparent double-
dissociation between first- and third-person similarity judgments, which would not be predicted 
if one measure were simply more precise.  That is, first-person judgments systematically related 
to the experience of embodiment, but not skin complexion, while third-person judgments 
systematically related to skin complexion, but not the experience of embodiment. 
Skin complexion is a purely superficial feature of the body. Our results suggest that 
people may rely on such superficial features when making third person judgements, but are 
effectively blind to them when judging first-person experience.  An interesting challenge for 
social psychology would involve investigating conditions which allow the surface-blindness of 
embodied first-person judgements to affect third-person judgements also.  Our data suggest that 
superficial features such as skin complexion are relevant to third-person judgments, but not to 
judgements based on embodied experience.  We therefore suggest that activities in which several 
individuals share embodied experience may enhance social cohesion.  This point has long been 
recognized in anthropology (Mead, 1928).  Individuals, even those who are physically dissimilar, 
might feel themselves to be quite similar if they have shared embodied multisensory experience 
linking their two bodies.  For example, reciprocal action observation, joint action (e.g., Sebanz, 
Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003), and automatic imitation (e.g., Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006; 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) all provide correlated multisensory inputs across individuals that are 
broadly comparable with the inputs eliciting the RHI.  Under such situations, the generic 
morphological body image, which all humans essentially share, essentially from birth (cf. 
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Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), may emphasise the broad similarities between individuals’ bodies, 
rather than superficial differences. 
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Footnotes 
1) Italics are used to indicate components of the experience of the RHI extracted by Longo 
et al. (2008b). 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure1: Scatterplots showing relations between (a) 3
rd
 person similarity ratings and skin 
luminance, (b) 1
st
 person similarity ratings and skin luminance, and (c) 1
st
 and 3
rd
 person 
similarity ratings. 
 
Figure 2: Mean similarity judgments between participants’ hands and the rubber hand as a 
function of whether they had experienced the rubber hand illusion, as judged by participants 
themselves (first-person), or by a separate sample of raters (third-person).  Error bars reflect one 
SEM. 
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